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The Depth of the Trade in Service Agreement
I. INTRODUCTION

The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)1 is set against a history of
frustration. The concessions through the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) system have fallen well short of expectations.2 Current
concessions in service sectors date from the conclusion of the GATS at
the end of the Uruguay Round in 1995. Ten years of service negotiations
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) have failed to produce
conclusive results,3 and stand-alone service negotiations in 2000 failed to
make progress.4 Of the 211 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in
force in 2012, only 89 cover services. The United States, Singapore, and
Chile negotiated the majority of these agreements primarily after 2000.5
One veteran of the Doha negotiations lamented that because the Doha
negotiators were discouraged by the complexity of service liberalization,
they “spent maybe five–ten percent of their time on services and sixty–
seventy percent of their time on goods and agriculture.”6 As stated by
Deputy USTR Michael Punke in 2012, the “genesis of [TISA]…lies in
our hard-nosed assessment that we simply will not be able to make real
progress on services trade liberalization any time soon under existing
WTO frameworks.”7
Service negotiations are hard. The glaring and unexamined question
is: Why? This paper will examine the current trade literature on what is
known about TISA to date and subject that information to a feasibility
analysis for trade in service agreements. The goal is to understand what
went wrong in previous attempts to liberalize services and/or trade, what
might be going wrong in TISA, and how it might be made right. In the
end, the article will conclude that TISA’s potential will not be realized
on its current course. The only feasible aspects of the agreement are its
recognition of dormant economic and political potential. Deficiencies
include multilateral consensus, regulatory hurdles, credence among the
parties, and a basic understanding of the effects of service liberalization.
Further lacking are the resources needed to approach these deficiencies.
This paper offers two primary recommendations. First, there is a need for
more research, theory and data collection on trade in services to address
a critical lack in both understanding and persuasive power. Second, there
is a need for an independent multilateral effort toward regulatory

1

The working name of the services agreement was changed from an “International Services
Agreement (ISA)” to the “Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)” immediately prior to the
publication of U.S., EU at Odds, infra note 27.
2
Stuart Harbinson & Aik Hoe Lim, Trade in Services, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A
QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AGREEMENT 133, 133 (C. J. Lim et al. eds., 2012).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 134.
5
Id. at 135.
6
J. Bradford Jensen, Book Release Address given at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics: Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts, and Offshoring (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.piie.com/events/event_detail.cfm?EventID=202.
7
USTR Takes First Steps to Services Negotiations, WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT (Jan. 21,
2013) [hereinafter WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT].
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convergence—prior to TISA—with recognition of the supremacy of
national decision-making.
Part I will describe the elements and issues of TISA as they stand at
this point in negotiations. Part II will work through a seven-factor
feasibility analysis of the agreement. Part III will draw upon the
preceding analysis to offer recommendations.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF TISA
A. Plurilateral Negotiations
TISA was proposed in a policy brief from the Peterson Institute for
International Economics in January 2012.8 Since then, preliminary talks
have taken place among a plurilateral group of twenty-one WTO
members9 originally referred to as the “Real Good Friends” of Services
coalition.10 In December 2012, participants agreed to a rough framework
for the formal discussions.11 Formal notification of negotiations was
provided to the U.S. Congress in January 2013,12 where the initiative
already enjoyed strong support.13 However, other TISA Negotiating
Parties (Negotiating Parties) must fulfill their own domestic procedures
for beginning a new trade negotiation before full negotiations may
begin.14 The details of TISA negotiations and scheduling are unsettled,15
but if everything works as planned, the agreement is anticipated to
conclude by 2014.16

8
Peterson Institute Argues for Services Deal Along Lines of U.S. Position, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(May 3, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-05/04/2012/petersoninstitute-argues-for-services-deal-along-lines-of-us-position/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter Peterson
Institute].
9
These members are: Canada, the United States and Mexico in North America; the European
Union plus Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland in Europe; Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea in Asia; Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru in Central
and South America; and Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey in the Middle East. Matthew Kronby & Milos
Barutciski, The Trade in Services Agreement: Opportunities for Canadian Service Suppliers,
BENNETT JONES LLP, (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.bennettjones.com/Publications/Updates/The_
Trade _ in_ Services_Agreement__ Opportunities_for_Canadian_Service_Suppliers/#page=1.
10
WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 1; Punke Outlines U.S.-EU Differences on ITA
Expansion, New Services Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 22, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/InsideUS-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-03/23/2012/punke-outlines-us-eu-differences-on-ita-expansion-newservices-deal/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter Punke Outlines].
11
USTR Says It Will Seek To Cover New Services In Plurilateral Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://insidetrade.com /Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-01/18/2013/ustr-says-itwill-seek-to-cover-new-services-in-plurilateral-agreement/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter USTR
Says].
12
WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 1.
13
WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 5.
14
USTR Says, supra note 11.
15
Amy Porges, Panel discussion at the International Trade and Law Society Distinguished
Alumni Dinner: The Impact of a Successful E.U.-U.S. Trade Agreement and the Transpacific
Partnership Agreement on World Trade (Apr. 22, 2013) (on file with American University,
Washington College of Law).
16
Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
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B. A Standalone Deal Outside of the WTO

A subset of WTO members committed to trade liberalization is
negotiating TISA as a stand-alone deal outside the WTO.17 However,
other WTO members could potentially join the negotiations, and the deal
could later be brought into the WTO framework through a vote of
members, similar to the manner in which the Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA) was brought under the WTO.18
C. Market Access Expectations
TISA negotiations are expected to reflect new types of services that
have emerged since GATS was negotiated.19 These Negotiating Parties
generally seek to expand market access concessions.20 Sectors that have
been expressly included on the agenda are telecommunications,21
insurance,22 digital media,23 engineering,24 accounting,25 higher
education,26 and audiovisual services.27
D. Positive List for Scheduling Market Access Concessions
Negotiating Parties have agreed to a positive list for scheduling
market access concessions28 that obligates countries to open only those

17

Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
Peterson Institute, supra note 8.
Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
20
Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
21
Jeffrey J. Schott et al., Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in 99 POLICY ANALYSES
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 31 (2013).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 21; Office of the United States Trade Representative, Interagency Trade Policy Group
Holds Public Hearing on Negotiating Objectives for International Services Agreement Negotiations,
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/march/tpsc-serviceshearing (quoting Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Services Christopher P. Melly’s
Opening Statement at a Public Hearing before the Trade Policy Staff Committee on an International
Services Agreement).
24
Schott et al., supra note 21; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra
note 23.
25
Schott et al., supra note 21; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra
note 23.
26
Schott et al., supra note 21; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra
note 23.
27
The European Union has never made, and does not want to make, any commitments on
audiovisual services, but the U.S. has indicated that it will press Europe on this issue. U.S., EU at
Odds Over Audiovisual Services In Plurilateral Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-03/29/2013/us-eu-at-odds-overaudiovisual-services-in-plurilateral-negotiations/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter U.S., EU at Odds].
28
Compromise ‘Hybrid’ Approach For Services Deal Largely Follows GATS, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Oct. 9, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/201210092412372/WTO-Daily-News/DailyNews/compromise-hybrid-approach-for-services-deal-largely-follows-gats/menu-id-948.html
[hereinafter Compromise]; Geneva Services Group Picks Scheduling Approach To Attract BRICS,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 7, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/201302072423893/WTO-DailyNews/Daily-News/geneva-services-group-picks-scheduling-approach-to-attract-brics/menu-id948.html [hereinafter Geneva].
18
19
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sectors that they specifically schedule to foreign competition.29 A
negative list would open all sectors to foreign competition, except for
sectors carved-out of the agreement.
The use of a positive list approach has no real consequences for the
negotiation of market access concessions as compared to a negative list
approach.30 A negative list with a great number of carve-outs would be
identical to a limited positive list. These two approaches can be thought
of as glass-half-full and glass-half-empty perspectives on scheduling
concessions and may affect early negotiations in a corresponding way—
it is easier to begin with the optimistic attitude that accompanies positive
control as opposed to the pessimistic attitude that accompanies negative
control. Concrete consequences resulting from the choice of methods
could arise for future, not-yet-existent services, which would
automatically be covered by a negative list. Those sectors could not be
specifically listed at the time of negotiation, but would be subject to
inclusion in the agreement through periodical negotiations under the
positive approach.31 Coverage of not-yet-existent services was an explicit
goal of the United States;32 however, negotiators have indicated that notyet-existent services might still be captured through a flexible definition
of service categories or a process for modernizing concessions after an
initial deal is inked.33 Additionally, the positive list approach more
closely follows the GATS scheduling commitments,34 which a) makes
TISA easier to potentially integrate into the current GATS architecture;35
b) makes it easier for the European Commission to argue that TISA is a
continuation of the multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round and,
thereby, avoid requesting a new negotiating mandate; and, c)
acknowledges Negotiating Parties’ interest in attracting China and other
emerging markets to a more familiar agreement.36
E. Negative List for National Treatment Commitments
(The New Hybrid Approach)
Under the GATS structure, WTO members also used a positive list to
negotiate national treatment. In other words, in those areas that WTO
members agreed to liberalize, they reserved the right to treat domestic
providers more favorably than foreign ones except in those specific areas
29

Compromise, supra note 28; Geneva, supra note 28.
U.S., Other WTO Members See ‘Hybrid’ Approach On Services Plurilateral, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Sept. 20, 2012) http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-09/21/2012/usother-wto-members-see-hybrid-approach-on-services-plurilateral/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter
Hybrid].
31
‘Positive List’ In Services Deal Requires Periodic Renegotiation Says CSI President, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/201302052423579/WTO-Daily-News/DailyNews/positive-list-in-services-deal-requires-periodic-renegotiation-says-csi-president/menu-id948.html [hereinafter Positive List]; USTR Says, supra note 11.
32
Positive List, supra note 31; USTR Says, supra note 11.
33
Positive List, supra note 31; USTR Says, supra note 11.
34
Geneva, supra note 28.
35
Geneva, supra note 28; Positive List, supra note 31; Hybrid, supra note 30.
36
Geneva, supra note 28; Hybrid, supra note 30.
30
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where they agreed to National Treatment commitments. In TISA, by
contrast, members will be obligated to provide full National Treatment
commitments in all liberalized sectors unless they specifically carve-out
the areas in which they reserve the right to treat domestic providers more
favorably than foreign ones.37 Using a combination of positive and
negative lists to schedule market access and National Treatment
commitments has been labeled a “hybrid” approach.38 Expansion of the
principle of nondiscrimination was a stated goal of the Negotiating
Parties.39
F. Ratchet-in & Standstill Lock-ins for National Treatment
(But Not for Market Access)
TISA is expected to lock in liberalization undertaken unilaterally by
parties since the GATS came into force.40 The Negotiating Parties have
agreed that TISA will prohibit signatories from going back on National
Treatment commitments that exist under their current regime.41 This is
referred to as the standstill commitment. TISA negotiators will also
extend unilateral National Treatment commitments to all other
signatories, preventing them from backing off those concessions,42 an
obligation referred to as a ratchet.
Like the positive list for scheduling market access concessions,
Negotiating Parties adopted these approaches in part to attract other
WTO members to the agreement in the future. In GATS, the ratchet and
standstill obligations also apply only to National Treatment
commitments, and not to market access concessions.43 However,
Negotiating Parties viewed application of the ratchet and standstill
obligations as potentially inhibiting to future liberalization, if signatories’
incremental improvements to market access were inflexible and legally
binding.44

37

Compromise, supra note 28; Geneva, supra note 28; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9;
USTR Says, supra note 11.
38
Geneva, supra note 28; Positive List, supra note 31.
39
Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk Notifies
Congress of Intent to Negotiate New International Trade Agreement on Services (Jan. 15, 2013)
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/january/ustr-kirk-notifies-congressnew-itas-negotiations [hereinafter USTR Notification]; Office of the United States Trade
Representative, supra note 23; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
40
USTR Notification, supra note 39; Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra
note 23; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
41
Geneva, supra note 28.
42
Geneva, supra note 28.
43
Geneva, supra note 28.
44
WTO Members Discuss Services Deal Elements Linked To Potential Expansion, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Oct. 4, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-10/05/2012/wtomembers-discuss-services-deal-elements-linked-to-potential-expansion/menu-id-710.html.
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G. Expectations for New Rules
TISA negotiators have been given a weighty and complex task in
assembling a “gold standard, A-grade agreement.”45 However, they need
not start from scratch. There is already an extensive network of bilateral
and regional preferential trade agreements among the negotiating
countries, stakeholder and public interest contributions to Negotiating
Parties, half-concluded negotiations under the Doha round, and parallel
plurilateral service negotiations under the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Drawing on those precedents, the January 2012 Peterson Institute
briefing paper recommended that particular provisions of GATS be
bolstered in TISA,46 creating a “GATS-plus” agreement.
Some provisions will be procedural—the United States has indicated
that it wants to ensure greater transparency and predictability for its
service providers from their trading partners.47 Among other issues, the
January 2012 Peterson Institute briefing paper recommended that TISA
include new competition policy and mutual recognition of professional
credentials.48 On cross-border data flows,49 the United States has
indicated that it will propose equal treatment for electronically delivered
goods and services, absolute freedom of cross-border data transfers, and
freedom from regulations requiring companies to locate data servers in
any particular location.50 Australia and New Zealand are opposed to
freedom of cross-border data transfers on the grounds that such transfers
might not provide adequate protection and control over their citizens’
electronic data.51
Other provisions will be specific to a particular sector. On financial
services, for instance, the United States may push for GATS-plus market
access, including the right to establish commercial presence, one hundred
percent ownership, and the provision of cross-border services without the
requirement to establish commercial presence.52 Participants have
generally agreed to address provisions such as licensing53 and barriers on
investment, including requirements as to residency, form of

45

Mexican WTO Official Advocates Two Stages For New Services Agreement, INSIDE U.S
TRADE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-12/21/2012/csipresident-confident-ustr-will-push-for-soe-rules-in-plurilateral-deal/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter
Mexican].
46
Peterson Institute, supra note 8.
47
USTR Notification, supra note 39; Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra
note 23; USTR Says, supra note 11.
48
Peterson Institute, supra note 8.
49
Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9; Joshua Meltzer, The Internet, Cross-Border Data Flows
and International Trade, BROOKINGS RESEARCH (Feb. 2013),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/25-internet-data-flows-international-trademeltzer.
50
CSI President ‘Confident’ USTR Will Push For SOE Rules In Plurilateral Deal, INSIDE U.S
TRADE (Dec. 20, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-12/21/2012/csipresident-confident-ustr-will-push-for-soe-rules-in-plurilateral-deal/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter
CSI President].
51
Schott et al., supra note 21, at 32.
52
Schott et al., supra note 21, at 21.
53
Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
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establishment, participation in joint ventures, or the satisfaction of
economic needs tests.54
Both the European Union and the United States have indicated that it
is unlikely that members involved in the plurilateral negotiations will
have to make commitments on opening up to private competition
government-provided services, such as public water utilities.55 However,
the “trade distorting actions” of State Owned Enterprises are an issue
likely to be raised in the negotiations and unfavorably received by other
WTO members.56 Some parties, although certainly not all, will likely
support provisions addressing government procurement of services.57
Another specific matter that some of the parties have marked as
important is allowing individuals to go to other countries to supply
services (called Mode 4 supply in GATS).58 Discussions on cross-border
movement of workers would begin with improving temporary entry for
business people, professionals, and technical experts, including intracompany transfers, which can be important for businesses operating in
foreign markets.59 The Peterson Institute for International Economics has
proposed going further, with liberal rules for the movement of semiskilled workers.60 The United States is generally opposed to
liberalization of Mode 4, due to the impact on domestic immigration
concerns.61 Turkey has taken an opposite tack and proposed an entire
separate chapter on Mode 4, including binding regulations on how
countries grant visas.62
III. A FEASIBILITY TEST FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS
There are seven interrelated factors making cooperation on broad and
deep plurilateral liberalization of trade in services increasingly
difficult—seven questions which may highlight TISA’s capability to
reach its ambitious liberalization and multilateralization goals. First, does
TISA and/or services liberalization have the potential to increase trade
and make money? Second, what is the collective will among WTO
members to implement services liberalization and eventually
multilateralize TISA under WTO? Third, what are the domestic political
obstacles to participation in TISA? Fourth, what is the potential for
critical regulatory convergence among the major international economic
players? Fifth, what impact could the recent history of cooperative
efforts have on the liberalization and multilateralization of TISA? Sixth,
54

Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
U.S., EU at Odds, supra note 27.
56
WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 5; CSI President, supra note 50.
57
Peterson Institute, supra note 8; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
58
Peterson Institute, supra note 8; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
59
Peterson Institute, supra note 8; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9.
60
Peterson Institute, supra note 8.
61
Peterson Institute, supra note 8.
62
EU Proposal On Horizontal Disciplines In Services Talks Met With Skepticism, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Mar. 28, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-03/29/2013/euproposal-on-horizontal-disciplines-in-services-talks-met-with-skepticism/menu-id-172.html.
55
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what do we actually know about the functioning of trade in services
under liberalization, and is it enough to actually predict results? Seventh,
do negotiators from each country (or at least the major players) have
access to sufficient resources of staff and finances to effectively
complete the negotiations?
A. The Economic Factor: No Risks in Liberalization for the Developed
Countries
The first question is whether a new trade plurilateral agreement has
the potential to benefit the parties economically. The economic size of
the parties involved in the agreement is substantial. TISA involves
twenty-one Negotiating Parties, representing forty-seven economies, and
nearly two-thirds of global services.63 Generally, domestic service
production is the dominant economic activity in the world.64 In lowincome economies, service sectors accounted for 45% of GDP, which
climbs to 57% in middle-income economies, and almost 71% in highincome economies.65
The first factor is whether liberalizing trade in services will actually
stimulate those large numbers. If goods and services are essentially
economic equivalents, there is a clear and simple economic argument for
the liberalization of services: liberalization of trade in goods has
correlated very strongly with growth,66 and services (unlike goods) are
relatively un-liberalized.67 There is, however, considerable debate as to
whether trade in services is the same kind of trade as trade in goods, and
therefore whether the strong correlation of growth with liberalization
ought to apply, in theory, to services as well. This potential lack of
theoretical understanding dovetails into issues considered under the sixth
factor of feasibility. It is possible that the effects of services liberalization
are well understood and economically valuable, or neither wellunderstood nor economically valuable, or only one but not the other.
Unfortunately, while the debate is ongoing and evidence is scarce, it is
difficult to separate the two theories—so we must examine both
assumptions.

63
64

Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 23.
MAX PLANCK, WTO: TRADE IN SERVICES at ix (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Peter-Tobias Stoll eds.,

2008).

65
Juan A. Marchetti, Developing Countries in the WTO Services Negotiations: Doing Enough?,
in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 82, 84 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis,
eds., 2007).
66
Ian F Fergusson, CRS Report for Congress: World Trade Organization Negotiations: The
Doha Development Agenda 7–8 (Jan. 18 2008). Trade “plays an independent and positive role in
raising incomes” and productivity. OECD, Trade, Growth and Jobs, http://www.oecd.org/tad/
tradedev/50447052.pdf at 1.
67
Jensen, supra note 6.
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1. If Service Liberalization is Similar to Goods
Speaking to the lack of liberalization of services, J. Bradford Jensen,
an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economic,
calculates that tradable business services are five times less likely to be
exported than manufactured products.68 He argues that if the exports-tosales ratio in tradable business services were increased to the same level
as manufacturing, there would be a 40% increase in total U.S. exports.69
As Jensen modestly assures, “[e]ven if those aren’t the right numbers, the
right numbers are big.”70 Additionally, more service exports mean more
jobs. USTR estimates that every $1 billion in U.S. services exports
supports an estimated four thousand U.S. jobs,71 equating to about three
million additional jobs. Workers in tradable services earn about 20%
more than workers in similar industries, even accounting for their higher
education, and service jobs are qualitatively better.72 Although these
estimates ought to be considered on a country-by-country basis, the basic
assumptions about the impact resulting from growth in services exports
will often be the same for other developed countries.
Developed countries have the most to gain from liberalization of trade
in services. Comparative advantage is the traditional way to think about
the opportunities in trade—a country has trading advantage where its
factors of production are abundant. For services, the most salient factor is
skill/education and, in general, the United States and other developed
countries have a great comparative advantage in the amount and quality
of highly skilled, or highly educated, service providers.73 The United
States is also currently the world’s largest services trader.74 Additionally,
Jensen speculates that there are obvious future opportunities for
developed countries to reap dividends from a coming forty trillion dollar
global infrastructure boom, mostly in the emerging economies, involving
architecture, financing, engineering, water treatment, and project
management services.75
For the developed world, there is urgency to capturing Jensen’s
benefits. The developing world’s comparative advantage through skilled
labor and education is rapidly eroding. In the cohort of individuals
between the ages of 25–29 in 2010, the level of education around the
world has more or less flattened, compared to the same aged cohort
thirty-five years ago (who are now earning their peak lifetime incomes),
a cohort group in which the United States clearly had a massive
educational comparative advantage.76 Also, the coming infrastructure
68

Jensen, supra note 6; USTR Notification, supra note 39.
Jensen, supra note 6.
70
Jensen, supra note 6.
71
Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 23; USTR Notification, supra
note 39.
72
Jensen, supra note 6.
73
Jensen, supra note 6.
74
USTR Notification, supra note 39.
75
Jensen, supra note 6.
76
Jensen, supra note 6.
69
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boom is likely to be (at least partially) government projects, and many
large, fast-growing, emerging economies are not participants in the
WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement, so interactions between
GATS as it is and the GPA would make liberalization within those
emerging economies difficult.77
If services are traded in the same way as goods—again, still an
untested hypothesis—then the risks of the liberalization of services are
also best considered through the lens of comparative advantage.78 There
may79 or may not80 be justification for widespread concerns about job
losses from adjustments in developed economies as a result of liberalized
trade; however, even if the fears are justified, developed countries risk
limited outsourcing losses from liberalization in services trade. Tradable
services are skill intensive, and the United States is (still) relatively skill
abundant.81 Jensen has further found that only about 25% of tradable
service jobs are low-wage jobs below the U.S. threshold of comparative
advantage—thereby subject to outsourcing. Additionally, no region in
the United States has a high concentration of those low-wage tradable
service jobs. The jobs that would be dislocated by liberalized service
trade are largely in dynamic urban areas, suggesting that whatever
impact occurred from the minimal economic displacement would be
evenly absorbed into the background of the entire U.S. economy.82
Again, country-by-country analysis may reveal differences, but similar
assumptions should apply to all large, developed economies.
In contrast to the developed countries, the primary opportunity for
developing economies is time. The world is experiencing a hospitable
environment for economic catch-up.83 So long as countries have some
combination of fundamental background conditions, ideas and blueprints
will spread, and firms from developing countries will be able to take
advantage of the educational and technological infrastructures of the
developed world.84 Similarly, time can only add to what little is known
now about the underlying factors that determine whether a developing
country produces significant service exports. The best we can say is that

77

Jensen, supra note 6.
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79
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advantage, suggesting further adjustment in the U.S. economy. Jensen, supra note 6.
80
Import growth, in general, is a sign of economic recovery, not a sign of increasing
displacement of jobs; the effects of manufactured imports have been positive on equality and
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in US manufacturing employment has been driven by the combination of a shift in domestic demand
away from spending on goods and faster productivity growth in manufacturing. Lawrence Edwards
& Robert Lawrence, Rising Tide: Is Growth in Emerging Economies Good for the United States?
(Oct. 18, 2011) (book release presentation, delivered at Peterson Institute for International
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education and human capital is critical for certain service sectors,85 and
developing economies are only going to close the education gap.86
Jensen asserts that developing economies need access to cheap
services to build their infrastructures.87 Additionally, service exports
typically require much more infrastructure for the importer than the
exporter and, in such a case, a developing country can compete on a very
high level with minimal investment at home.88 However, negotiating
service trade agreements is resource-intensive, and so developing
countries that face challenges negotiating the agreement may be more
motivated to join in when the work is done, and their own service sectors
are stronger.
2. If Service Liberalization is Different
Taking economists at their word, some progress has been made in
analyzing the economic effects of service trades in the special form of
trade-in-tasks, or outsourcing. Trade-in-tasks has been shown to be
theoretically analogous to migration of foreign factors of production to
the outsourcing nation while retaining foreign costs.89 Gene Grossman
and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, who introduced the idea of trade-in-tasks,
have shown that this conception of trade is economically beneficial in a
formal analogy with technological improvement.90 At the same time,
Robert Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud have introduced an analytic
framework which takes into account known special cases and integrates
trade-in-tasks theory with mainstream trade theory,91 adding certainty to
the problem of unexpected outcomes92 and inapplicability of standard
trade theorems.93 As it continues to develop, the theory of trade-in-tasks
may offer further assurances that the familiar beneficial effects of trade
liberalization under GATT will continue.
B. The Consensus Factor: No Multilateralization
The second factor is the sum of any evidence for bringing the trade
agreement to the multilateral system. In this area, the TISA Negotiating
85

Arti Grover Goswami et al., Exporting Services: A Developing Country Perspective, in
EXPORTING SERVICES: A DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 2, 18 (World Bank 2012).
86
Jensen, supra note 6.
87
Jensen, supra note 6.
88
Goswami et al., supra note 85 at 5.
89
Robert Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Trade-in-Goods and Trade-in-Tasks: An
Integrating Framework at 3–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper, 15882, Apr. 2010)
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15882.
90
Gene M. Grossman & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Rise of Offshoring: It’s Not Wine for Cloth
Anymore, 2–3 (2006), http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/research/papers/grossman_rise
_offshoring _0602.pdf [hereinafter Rise of Offshoring]; Gene M. Grossman & Esteban RossiHansberg, Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1978, 1980 (2008)
[hereinafter Trading Tasks]; Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud, supra note 89, at 5.
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Parties have made a gamble by not including the large, emerging
economies—believing that there will be enough pressure from a final
agreement to force a multilateral adoption.94 The desire of the TISA
Negotiating Parties to “redefine global trade”95 and then multilateralize
the agreement at the WTO—most likely through the use of GATT
Article V96—has been quite explicit.97 However, despite deep divisions
on the question of new entrants to TISA,98 the Negotiating Parties are
unlikely to extend the benefits of a deal until a critical mass of WTO
members join, to avoid the free riders problem—new countries receiving
benefits from TISA without making any concessions during the
negotiations.99 Reaching the critical mass of new entrants is an unlikely
achievement.
Although many of the TISA Negotiating Parties have called for the
removal of barriers to entry for new entrants these requests are
contradicted by equally strong calls for deep commitments that WTO
members are unlikely to make.100 The United States, for instance, is both
anticipating and discouraging China’s accession to TISA with regulatory
proposals for rules disciplining state-owned enterprises.101
Outside the intentions and capacities of the TISA Negotiating Parties,
there is little indication that the large, emerging economies, in particular,
have either the capacity or the will to join a multilateral TISA under any
mechanism. Politically, the large, emerging economies are not
interested,102 and they have the power to block TISA at the WTO.103
Once a plurilateral agreement is concluded, its value may be perceived as
having something which is denied to others—possibly motivating
countries outside the deal to enter, but equally motivating signatories to
refuse entry to countries outside the deal, and so hindering the political
94
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2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-09/21/2012/korean-ministerstresses-need-for-clear-path-to-multilateral-services-deal/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter Korean
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task of multilateralization,104 at least in the short term. If TISA is to be a
building block rather than a stumbling block to multilateralization, then it
must be undertaken with a greater regard for brokering an eventual
multilateral global consensus, with more than symbolic concessions to
the large, emerging economies.
C. The Constituencies Factor: Liberalization will be Subject to Political
Skill
The third factor is whether governments have the support of domestic
constituencies to take on new international commitments.105 One of the
lessons of the collapse of nineteenth century globalization was that
national governments will be unable to maintain open economies if they
do not have the support of their constituents, whether they be narrow
elites or broad masses.106 On the one hand, politicians have the advantage
in managing constituencies. Each government’s trade agreement may be
somewhat crafted in the first place by an active political organization and
outside the reach of any transparency in developing trade negotiations. If
constituent support turns against a deal, political organizations may be
capable of pushing it through. For instance, the governments which
negotiated NAFTA in Canada and the United States were both defeated
in elections in which anti-NAFTA public sentiment was a significant
factor and yet the agreement was ultimately signed by the anti-NAFTA
successor governments. On the other hand, in virtually all countries,
political incentives are heavily weighted on domestic problems at the
expense of international ones,107 and political capital is not infinite. In the
aftermath of the Great Recession, the TISA Negotiating Parties and other
WTO members will likely face greater than normal domestic political
resistance.108 Examples of the tenuous balance in the United States,
European Union, and Japan, the largest players among the TISA
Negotiating Parties, are illustrative.
One major American constituency is firmly in favor of trade
liberalization: internationally oriented financial institutions and
corporations.109 In Congress, TISA has strong early support110 and trade
agreements have generally fared well: Congress has passed twelve of the
fifteen PTAs with hundreds of votes to spare.111 Even the ostensibly
nationalist and neo-isolationist112 Tea Party is not a protectionist group in
104
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Congress where 65 of its 85 members have approved all the negotiations
for three of the new PTAs.113 On the other side, public opinion toward
international trade was more hostile in 2007 in the United States than in
any of the other 47 countries regularly surveyed by Pew Charitable
Trust.114 While that opinion may be changing with the demographics of
the country,115 the majority of Americans, especially those with lower
incomes, believe that liberalized trade reduces jobs, wages, and the
economy as a whole.116 Only Americans with college degrees and
incomes above $100,000 hold positive views on trade liberalization.117
European public opinion towards trade liberalization in general is
more even than in the United States,118 and not as politically charged.
However, Europeans overwhelmingly believe that globalization makes
society more unequal, and that it is only good for large companies. As an
example of political restructuring to win the favor of constituencies,
economic growth is presented to the public in Europe as a defensive
measure to protect citizens who do not have work, rather than as an
economic reward in itself.119 As explained in The Economist, “Europe…
is not the most dynamic and competitive economy in the world, because
lots and lots of Europeans do not want to live in the most dynamic and
competitive economy in the world.”120 Yet, European politicians must
craft trade liberalization. The European Union is confronting some major
internal economic issues, and these problems are likely to draw upon
much of its politicians’ energies for the foreseeable future.121
Japanese public opinion has traditionally been more accepting of
governmental authority, with a sharp drop in the past two decades
following a prolonged economic slump. However, in a very short time,
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has generated a great deal of political
capital with which to negotiate TISA. The initial results of “Abenomics”
seem to be generating a rising stock market and improving business
sentiment122 and Abe’s Cabinet approval rating now stands above
70%.123 On the other hand, the Japanese organization of agricultural
interests, JA-Zenchu, is a strong and vocal protectionist group,
representing a predominant public concern with national interests.124
Although agriculture is not directly on the table in TISA, JA-Zenchu has
113
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weighed in on other issues of national interest, such as health care, in the
past.125 Additionally, while trade issues are relatively unknown in other
countries, discussions of national interests in potential trade agreements
are frequently front-page news in Japanese newspapers.126
D. The Sovereignty Factor: Shallow Regulatory Convergence
The biggest prize127 and the hardest puzzle128 for TISA will be greater
regulatory convergence. Trade negotiators’ traditional area of expertise,
border measures, have little bearing on trade in services. Negotiators
attempt to get all sides to move towards common rules, or at least
regulations that are close enough that each party can accept the others’.
The issue at the heart of the agreement will be balancing the diverse
thicket of domestic regulations with the needs of international trade.129
Negotiations will be difficult.130 Domestic regulations are difficult to
police,131 hard to measure,132 locally focused and possibly more reflective
of entrenched national values than the border measures placed on
tangible goods.133 Even in instances where countries’ goals are aligned,
an unorthodox regulation that buys off the beneficiaries of the status quo
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may be preferable to an orthodox regulatory alignment which is
impossible to implement.134
Regulatory coherence within TISA will have to be shallow. Due to
the fact that all major countries engaging in TISA negotiations are
developed economies, these nations have already liberalized their
regulatory measures independently, although to varying degrees. For
example, both Western Europe and the United States already have low
regulatory barriers to trade in services, relative to the rest of the world.135
Despite the fact that these regulatory barriers are low, they show no signs
of falling any lower. Even between the United States and the European
Union, regulators’ attempts to move toward common rules have yielded
little progress.136 WTO rules have been effective in limiting
discriminatory regulatory measures, but have done little to eliminate the
non-discriminatory regulations that hinder international trade.137
Regional trade agreements follow the same approach as the WTO.
Governments’ rights to regulate are left intact.138 Developed countries
have been slow in many sectors to adopt international standards.139 WTO
transparency obligations on regulations of services have also been
largely ignored, with developed countries being the worst offenders.140
Conversely, other trade agreements have not improved collaboration
among regulatory agencies,141 and have not been well received by civil
society142 or regulators in the United States143 who are not eager to allow
their responsibilities (for which they are politically accountable144 ) to be
subject to potentially increased restrictions.
Among developing countries, there is also little pressure to attempt
greater regulatory convergence. They all impose high barriers to trade in
services.145 There is no global forum or mechanism for fostering a
discussion of the impacts of service sector policies, or the appropriate
design of regulations, which are the preconditions for realizing welfare
134
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gains from liberalization.146 Regulatory convergence is likely to remain
an exception rather than a rule.147
E. The Credence Factor: Subject to Improvement; Falling Short of
Multilateralization
The fifth factor in the analysis is whether the TISA Negotiating
Parties (and other potential members) have a track record of trust,
established through prior successes and cooperation. Importantly, the
WTO has been the most successful of humanity’s efforts at a global
system on a major issue.148 Globally, however, there is a disappointing,
checkered record of success for international cooperation on recent
international issues.149 The Center for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR) released a gloomy report in 2012 on collective international
efforts over the past decade and concluded “optimistic anticipation
has…given way to empty phrase-mongering.”150 Resentment toward
perceived bullying is another obstacle to collective action. Economist
Richard Baldwin makes the argument that twenty-first-century PTAs’ are
much less about the reciprocal negotiation of market access than about
stronger economies—the United States, the European Union and Japan—
negotiating in the context of significant power asymmetries and
imposing domestic reforms on weaker countries. In other words, strong
economies are perceived to be filling the factories of their weaker
counterparts in exchange for control over weak countries’ domestic
regulations.151
Among the TISA Negotiating Parties, the level of credibility is
higher—one of the factors which may have led to the initial Good
Friends of Services grouping. However, many of the TISA Negotiating
Parties have been working on Doha together for over a decade. The
failure to strengthen the multilateral system by concluding the Doha
Round is an honest embarrassment and major lack of credibility for
negotiating countries, especially those at the forefront in the G20.152
Those members of the G20 who have joined TISA negotiations are: the
United States, the European Union (including France, Germany, Italy,
and the UK), Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and
Turkey. Are these countries responsible for the Doha?153 The members of
the G20 that have not joined the TISA negotiations are: Argentina,
146
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Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
If responsibility for the withering death of Doha is laid at the feet of
these eight countries (BRICS+3?), perhaps that will allow the remaining
members of the G20 to negotiate TISA with genuine trust in their
partners, and with optimism for the prospect of cooperation.
More broadly, however, is there credence in the concept of a
plurilateral or multilateral services agreement at all? The WTO’s GATS,
the first multilateral agreement to address trade in services, achieved
little actual liberalization.154 In fact, the implementation of GATS does
not seem to have had significant effects on global trade at all. It is
difficult to separate trade in services from trade in goods. However,
while trade grew at roughly 11% per year in the decade before the
Uruguay Round (1985–1995),155 in the decade since the Uruguay Round,
the rate has been closer to 5%.156 It is possible that there may have been
an exogenous process that promoted trade in services before GATS, and
which ceased afterward. The telecommunication and financial
revolutions in the early 1990s are potential contenders.157 Nevertheless, it
is hard to imagine any such combination of processes which would
coincidentally negate any and all gains from GATS at precisely the same
time that the agreement was coming into effect. The more likely
conclusion is that all the growth in trade of services since GATS must be
attributed to advances in technology158 especially in communication
technology159 and also in transportation as well as unilateral
liberalizations.160
GATS did lock in the level of services liberalization that countries
had already achieved through unilateral reforms, ostensibly adding
certainty to services trade.161 However, many countries committed
themselves to levels of openness that were actually less liberal than their
applied measures, leaving room for later adjustments within the
agreement.162 Additionally, despite using a limited and cautious
approach, the GATS obligations agreed to by WTO members have, in at
least one case, turned out to be the reverse of what was intended.163 As a
result, GATS schedules have grown increasingly irrelevant.164
If the approach to TISA was considered a clear innovation on GATS,
the Negotiating Parties would enjoy the benefit of faith in the potential of
154
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that new innovation. However, the compromises announced thus far have
revealed a negotiating plan remarkably similar to GATS, with general
obligations and a positive list of specific commitments that give
members the option to schedule trade liberalization in service à la carte,
and to exclude controversial service sectors,165 albeit with the addition of
a negative list of National Treatment obligations.166 Only the hoped-for
addition of GATS-plus regulatory provisions holds any promise of
something new.167 Even in this area, other modern preferential trade
agreements have not yet played a role in promoting service exports.168
F. The Tractability Factor: We’re Liberalizing in the Dark
The sixth factor is whether the trade negotiation is approached with
sufficient understanding to practically solve the problems. Intractability
refers to a high level of complexity, which makes it difficult to change,
manipulate, or resolve an issue. Are services too complex to negotiate? Is
the challenge of the services trade liberalization in existing WTO
frameworks169 a consequence of a high level of complexity?
The first obvious hurdle is the structural resistance of service
industries, in other words, separating tradable services from non-tradable
ones. It is possible to separate them. Jensen, working through the
Peterson Institute, has identified tradable service industries and
occupations by locating national service industries with unusually high
geographical clustering within the United States but broad consumption,
thereby determining which services are already traded between American
states. Software, for example, is consumed everywhere in the United
States, but its development is clustered in Silicon Valley, and so software
development is a tradable service. From his calculations, Jensen
concludes that approximately sixty percent of services in the United
States are currently tradable.170
However, Jensen readily admits that there is not enough information
about current trade flows in the services sectors he has identified. He
states “[t]here are more than 10,000 manufacturing categories reported
on monthly from the U.S. census. Since 2006, there have been thirty
service categories that are reported on quarterly by the U.S census. There
is a lot more detail than before, but it’s not enough.”171 So we know
which service sectors are tradable in the United States, but we do not
know anything about how they are currently traded. Similarly
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understanding for the success or failure of other countries in exporting
services is hampered by the lack of available data.172
The supply of services is not well understood, either. The GATS
agreements is divided into four modes of supply, but the division of
supply under GATS into Mode 1 (cross-border), Mode 2 (consumption
abroad), Mode 3 (commercial presence), and Mode 4 (natural presence),
is impractical for real economic analysis. The different modes of supply
can complement or substitute for one another differently for specific
services.173 Instead, Jensen asserts that “[s]ervices are not delivered as
Mode 1 or 2 or 4—they are delivered as Mode 1 and 2 and 4, and parsing
that mix is difficult. Mode 3 is important, but separate—it works in a
very different way.”174
The biggest problem for TISA’s negotiators is a potential conflation
of the unknown functioning of trade in services with the relatively wellknown functioning of trade in goods. Services are frequently treated as a
type of good by trade theorists. Some economists, including Bhagwati,
argue that we do not need a new structural framework for the services
sector—that the basic concepts of international trade theory are as
applicable to services trade as they are to goods.175 Others, for reasons of
complexity of services and service sectors, believe that a clearer
conceptual understanding of services trade is required before any
theories can be drawn about the consequences of service trade
liberalization—on both economies and public policy objectives.176
Looking at the loose definitions and underperformance of GATS, and the
increasing interconnectedness of international trade, it is easy to
appreciate that caution.
Despite being the first and only WTO trade agreement on service
trade, GATS contains no explicit definition of a service. Instead, services
have been defined in trade theory as either not-goods (a diverse group of
economic activities distinct from manufacturing, mining, and
agriculture)177 or simply by a list of industries or sectors.178 Yet the
economic functioning of services has the potential to be radically
different than that of the services’ counterparts such as the industrial
sector or goods sector. Contrasted with goods, services are intangible;
they add value to the client directly (possibly, but not necessarily, by the
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transfer of rights to a good); they are simultaneously created and
consumed in a transaction (meaning they are also non-perishable, nontransferable, and non-storable); they are co-produced by the provider and
client; they are un-able to be inspected before delivery and therefore
priced with more emphasis on client expectations and less on real utility,
quality, cost of production, or taxes; they able to be delivered in dynamic
ways; and—most importantly for trade agreements—they are able to
generate (potentially unforeseeable) linkages by facilitating the
production of other commodities in an economy.179
International trade increasingly involves intermediate goods and tasks
along continuums of global supply chains.180 Anecdotal evidence is easy
to come by: a Barbie doll is manufactured in a crisscrossing web of tasks
performed in seven countries;181 Apple’s iPhones are notoriously
designed in California, sourced throughout Asia (adding 35% of its value
in Japan), and assembled in Shenzhen, China (adding only 4% of the
final value);182 and, according to the WTO, the value of typical American
car includes 30% from Korea, 17.5% from Japan, 7.5% from Germany,
4% from Taiwan and Singapore, 2.5% from the UK, 1.5% from Ireland
and Barbados, and the remaining 37% of the production value from the
United States.183 In these fragmented webs of production, the line
between goods and services is becoming less and less theoretically
relevant to multinational corporations. Is the final layer of paint applied
to a car a service or the manufacture of a product? Does it matter whether
the paint is applied at the dealership, or the factory—or by another
corporation entirely? Some economists have been working to create a
model of these new processes,184 yet the core of international trade theory
continues to be dominated by thinking about production and exchange of
completed goods.185
The negotiations themselves are yet another added complexity to
TISA. Tariff preferences can be changed incrementally, but preferences
for services are much more radical commitments—on/off switches that
either allow a trading partner to serve your market or not.186
Consequently, there is much more potential trade displacement with a
change in service preferences, and therefore a much greater value given
to agreements which include some WTO members but shut out others.187
A change in service preferences would be a huge advantage for first
runners, those given market access before any others. In addition, trade
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negotiators are typically experienced in dealing with border measures,
which require a completely different sort of competences and have little
bearing on services.188 Finally, negotiators have few benchmarks or
measures of progress in service negotiations.189 During Jensen’s launch
of his book at the Peterson Institute’s policy brief, a veteran of the Doha
Round negotiations posed an illustrative scenario in which he compared
negotiating tariffs and service schedules:
You establish a benchmark for reducing tariffs, and it’s
either zero or it’s a given percentage, and subsequently
you look at products and you average it out, and you get
to a certain tariff reduction. [But] anybody who’s seen a
services schedule knows that it takes about five months–
six months–just to understand what’s in the schedule.
It’s extremely difficult to actually find an objective way
of benchmarking and quantifying liberalization by third
countries who have barriers…. So I think there’s a real
problem in terms of the complexity of services schedules
and finding a coherent way in which you can agree
around the table on benchmarks to liberalize services. I
don’t know if you have a magic bullet for that
problem….190
Jensen replied: “There is a thicket of policy impediments. Measuring
service imports and exports is very difficult. It’s not clear that we’re
providing the level of resources that need to be provided to measure it
well. We’re largely in the dark.”191 Reaching practical economic or
political goals through TISA using the current set of analytic tools seems
impractical.
G. The Resources Factor: Too Few Negotiators, Regulators, and Money
The final factor in the analysis is the extent and quality of the
resources devoted to addressing the problems and doing the work of
negotiating TISA. The United States is the world’s largest economy and
the single largest player in the WTO system, TISA, and two other
ambitious regional trade negotiations happening simultaneously. And
yet, USTR—which is responsible for negotiating U.S. trade agreements,
participating in global trade policy organizations, resolving U.S. trade
disputes, and most importantly gathering input on trade issues and
helping to formulate the President's trade policy positions—currently has
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only 179 full time employees, down from 198 employees in 2011.192
USTR was ranked last in work quality among twenty-nine small U.S.
federal agencies in late 2012.193 In that comprehensive survey, USTR
staff showed dissatisfaction with their jobs, their organization, and the
effectiveness of their senior leaders.194 General budget pressures have
been exacerbated by the fact that some of USTR's general funds have
been redirected to another agency, the Interagency Trade Enforcement
Center (ITEC).195
If negotiating service trade agreements is resource-intensive for the
United States, it is considerably more so for its trading partners.196 The
people working in trade matters for other TISA Negotiating Partners are
presumably fewer in number and have less expertise and educational
background than in the United States. Through this paper’s analysis I
have concluded that TISA’s potential is not being realized with the level
of resources currently allocated. To reach that potential, a significantly
higher commitment is required.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether it is a shallow deal or a deep deal, the trade negotiations of
various governments are working to find “equilibrium of agreement” on
TISA.197 Liberalization along the lines of TISA is a risk free proposition
for developed countries, subject to the political skill of governments,
incremental improvements in the credence of trading partners, and
sufficient resources to complete the task. However, the conclusion of
TISA will very likely produce a shallow agreement with little
understanding of the effects of the liberalization gained. In sum, like
GATS before it, the deal will be a large investment, a drain on the
credibility of the world system, and will have little foreseeable value.
Multilateralization of such a deal will be easier if it is obviously shallow;
however, WTO members outside the TISA Negotiating Parties are
deeply skeptical of both the proposed agreement and its proponents’
records. Multilateralization under the current circumstances is
exponentially more unlikely if the deal has any real content at all.
It is likely that trade negotiators among the major economic powers
are well aware of these conclusions. Keynes infamously wrote that “it is
better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed
unconventionally,”198 and protecting the reputation of the parties may
ultimately be the overriding goal of the negotiations. It is also possible
192
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that negotiators are approaching TISA with a gambler’s dice and an
alchemist’s kit,199 knowing that no harm can come from trying, and
wasting resources on the hope that despite all indications to the contrary,
lightning may strike.
If these presumptions are false, the recommendations that follow
address the deficiencies of the TISA. These recommendations might
assist negotiators’ efforts toward TISA’s two original explicit goals: the
liberalization of services and the multilateralization of the concluded
agreement. The recommendations are selectively adapted from Thomas
J. Bollyky’s chapter on regulatory coherence in The Trans-Pacific
Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-first Century Trade Agreement,200
Jensen’s full recommendations in Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts,
and Offshoring, from the Peterson Institute for Economic Cooperation,201
and Sherry Stephenson’s presentation, “Regulatory Disciplines in Trade
Agreements,” given at the Australian Services Roundtable in 2007.202
A. More Research, Theory, and Data on Services Trade
The first step will be to abandon all hope and embrace data. We need
more research, and more intellectual and economic theory on trade in
services. Dorothy Dwoskin, senior trade policy director for Microsoft,
made the case eloquently at an event with the USTR. She argued that
"we've gotten so wrapped up in process, in procedure, we've lost sight of
the economic arguments of why services are so important…you need to
spend a lot more time helping create the intellectual and economic
argument on services trade liberalization.”203 These efforts must go
beyond economic and intellectual cheerleading to the level of a concerted
effort by the United States and its trade partners to support academic
theoretical and field research in services trade, and in trade as a whole.
As a necessary corollary, all trading partners must devise methods to
collect substantially more and better data on the service sector,204 and to
aid developing countries in their efforts to collect the same. To succeed
in liberalizing services trade we can no longer fly blind.
B. A Multilateral Effort on Regulatory Convergence
Drawing from Bollyky and Stephenson, a significant agreement in
services must address the serious challenges with regulatory coherence.
A sincere attempt to build regulatory coherence would be reflected in an
independent multilateral effort to promote regulatory convergence and
cooperation. The resulting mandate of such an effort would be preparing
199
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common technical regulations and standards, formulating Mutual
Recognition Agreements with conformity assessments, assessing and
recommending adoption of international standards, and promoting the
sharing of surveillance data and inspection reports through the
development of confidentiality arrangements.205 Maintaining sovereignty
and local accountability of national regulatory authorities will be
essential for meaningful participation across a multilateral field. The
participating governments must be confident that the final decision to
adopt the recommendations of regulatory coherence would remain with
them.206
C. Additional Recommendations
Seeing where services might be headed, Jensen proposed defensive
and offensive actions. Of the former, he suggested that the United States,
in cooperation with its developed trade partners, make access to primary,
secondary, and post-secondary education a high national priority. Jensen
further urged more attention be given to education at all ages, in order to
maintain American workers’ high skill level. He also added that the
United States should defensively strengthen its social safety net for
workers dislocated by trade and technological advancement.207 On the
offensive, he called for an “aggressive push” to open large, emerging
markets, liberalize the WTO, enlarge the GPA, and improve IP
protections. The defensive proposals make good policy sense now—even
if trade in services reveals strange new dynamics to trade, developed
countries will only be stronger with high quality education and protection
for workers. The offensive proposals are contradictory, and should be
shelved until given effective foundations.
Even in its current form, the potential of TISA depends on the
political skill of governments and the bridge-building skills of the
parties’ trade negotiators. Those factors should merely be reinforced. To
address the future goal of multilateralization, WTO members outside the
TISA Negotiating Parties must be convinced (and not pushed)208 into
appreciation of the merits of services trade liberalization, and the sincere
interest in reciprocal negotiations by the TISA Negotiating Parties. These
factors should follow from the above suggestions. Of course, sufficient
resources must be found to complete these tasks. The final factor, the
most difficult task in political life is to perceive the low rumble of a
distant crisis and then take responsibility for a new order of things. True
leadership is a necessary factor in all of the above.
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